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The conventional wisdom, both among public- 
policy experts and the voters on the street, has 
been that Proposition 13 was roughly equal to the 
Sylmar earthquake, except that we inflicted it 
upon ourselves. 
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I’m not sure when I ﬁrst got interested in this 
particular line of research—the fact that I have a 
son who is now 10 and that we had to make a lot 
of decisions about his educational future probably 
got me a bit worried, but I think it actually dates 
back to when we ﬁrst arrived in California in the 
fall of ’79.  It seemed that all anyone was talking 
about was Proposition 13, which had passed by  
a nearly 2-to-1 margin (65 to 35 percent) the  
previous year.  Everywhere we went, it was  
Proposition 13 this and Proposition 13 that.  
Some people felt that the voters had just gotten 
into an angry snit and had irrationally gone on an 
antigovernment crusade without thinking about 
the consequences; people on the other side felt that 
they had been provoked by then-governor Jerry 
Brown’s inane ﬁscal policies.  I don’t know if we 
ever sorted that out, but the conventional wisdom, 
both among public-policy experts and the voters 
on the street, has been that Proposition 13 was 
roughly equal to the Sylmar earthquake, except 
that we inﬂicted it upon ourselves.  
For those of you who may not know, Proposition 
13 was a statewide initiative that rolled back  
property-tax valuations signiﬁcantly for then-
current property owners.  (This has led to huge 
disparities in tax bills for similar houses on nearby 
lots, depending on whether the owner bought the 
house pre- or post-Proposition 13; this has caused 
a lot of interesting socioeconomic behavior, but 
that’s another story.)  Proposition 13 also stipu-
lated that in the future, local property taxes would 
be calculated at 1 percent of the price at which a 
property last sold, plus an allowance for a 2  
percent per year increase.  And, quite obviously,  
at least for a while, it reduced the amount of  
income that state and local governments were  
able to derive from property taxes.  Then, in 1979, 
a companion measure, Proposition 4, the Gann 
initiative, limited increases in state spending  
to the rate of inﬂation plus the rate of population 
growth—a double whammy.  
But public education got a triple whammy,  
with the third being the Serrano decisions.  In the 
original Serrano decision (Serrano v. Priest, 1971), 
the California Supreme Court ruled that the  
existing system of public ﬁnance, which was  
essentially the local property tax, was unconstitu- 
tional.  The reasoning was that all children in 
California had a fundamental right to equal public 
education, but if the funds for that education had 
to come from the local property-tax base a child 
living in, say, Baldwin Park could expect substan-
tially less support than a child living in Beverly 
Hills.  The good people of Baldwin Park would 
have to tax themselves at a rate perhaps 10 times 
higher than the people in Beverly Hills to support 
the same level of expenditure in their local school 
district.  Serrano forbade local school districts, at  
least as school districts, from spending more per 
pupil than the state average.  (There are ways 
around this—some wealthier school districts have 
put together private foundations that have by now 
raised very substantial sums.  No one really knows 
how much, because not everything they do has to  
be reported, but according to a recent study, such 
foundation money supplements spending in many 
districts by as much as 15 percent.)  On the other 
hand, Serrano also stipulated that the state govern- 
ment would give the poorer districts as much 
money as was needed to bring their per-pupil 
spending up to the norm.  The decision went 
through the courts for a while; Serrano II, in 1976, 
basically required its very rapid implementation,  
and by 1982, for all practical purposes, it was in 
place.  So the widespread belief is that the reduc- 
tion in tax take from Proposition 13 and its  
companion measures, plus the Serrano equalization  
mandate, led to a dramatic decline in public 
kindergarten-through-12th-grade education in 
California.  
In a recent book called Paradise Lost: California’s 
Experience, America’s Future, Peter Schrag, a long-
time editorial-page editor for the Sacramento Bee, 
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says that “the passage of Proposition 13 serves as  
a convenient way of dividing the post–World War 
II era in California between the postwar period of  
optimism, with its huge investment in public 
infrastructure and its strong commitment to the 
development of quality education systems and 
other public services, and a generation of declining 
conﬁdence and shrinking public services.”  I think 
this captures the view shared by a very large num-
ber of people: Proposition 13 is a watershed event 
that demarcates a much nicer and more glorious 
past from a fairly troubling present and future.  
With that, let’s take a look at the actual data.  
The plot above shows per-pupil spending from 
1968 through 1996 in California (the red line), 
versus the rest of the United States.  (I have 
converted all the data here and throughout into 
constant 1997 dollars.  At this point, I would also 
like to thank grad student and Excel guru Erik 
Terreri, who gave me a great deal of assistance in 
getting all this data together.)  You can see that 
there’s reason to believe that Schrag is right—the 
timing is right on the money.  Before 1982, we 
spent somewhat more, per pupil, than the rest of 
the country.  After that we tracked the other states 
from below for a while, and then we fell dramati-
cally behind in the late ’80s as the recession kicked 
in.  I should mention that by “the rest of the 
country,” I don’t mean the national average.  With 
California now containing about 12 percent of the 
country’s population, we’ve got enough weight to 
swing the national average around.  I mean the  
average expenditure of all the states except  
California and Alaska.  Alaska has a public-ﬁnance 
system that looks a lot more like Saudi Arabia’s 
than an American state’s, so it’s not usually  
included in these kinds of analyses.  
If you look at rankings, we were 18th from the 
top in per-pupil spending in academic 1975; by 
our nadir (1995), we were 41st.  Translated into 
average class size, we were 49th—Utah managed 
to get under us.  And the performance of Califor-
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It should be noted that the linkage between expenditure levels and 
student performance, which is usually measured by some standardized test, 
is tenuous at best.  In fact, if you look at the performance of the average 
pupil in a state, versus that state’s spending per pupil, the relationship is 
slightly negative.  In the 1997–98 academic year, for example, New Jersey 
spent over $10,000 per pupil, New York about $8,800, and quite honestly, 
on average, their students do poorly compared to places like North Dakota, 
which spent $5,100 per pupil and whose students do very well.  But  
spending varies all over the map—Wisconsin spent $7,100 per student and 
Iowa $6,000, and their students are also top performers.  California spent 
$5,500 per pupil; the national average was $6,000.   
When you look at California’s test scores correctly, in my view, the  
data are not that discouraging.  Since the early ’60s, the proportion of high-
school seniors taking the SATs and the ACTs has gone way up.  These used 
to be elite tests that only the college-prep kids, a small minority in each 
class, would take.  Now nearly everyone takes them.  So for as many stu-
dents to be doing as well as they are is actually, by some deﬁnitions, a  
remarkable accomplishment.  When you break down SAT scores by eth-
nicity, you see that over the last 20 years, there has been—not so much 
among white students, but among black and Latino students—a very 
steady and impressive improvement.  
Expenditure data can also be misleading.  For example, the L.A. Uniﬁed  
School District employs one of the largest police forces in the state of  
California.  That money shows up on the books as educational spending.  
And a few years ago there was a proposal to require that 90 percent of the 
education budget had to be spent in the classroom and not on administra-
tion.  I can’t conceive of that affecting what a school district does.  You just 
call stuff “classroom” and not “administration.”  So you really have to be 
careful with these data.  
Left:  State and local per-
pupil spending on public 
schools (kindergarten 
through 12th grade) in 
California (red) and the 
average for the rest of the 
United States (black).  The 
arrow marks the passage 
of Proposition 13 in 
California; a decline in 
spending followed 
immediately.
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nia schoolchildren on a series of standardized tests 
also declined, all pretty much in step with this 
decline in public expenditures.  
But there’s another way to look at the level of 
state and local support for education.  The graph 
above shows spending per pupil in terms of the 
available tax base, i.e., per thousands of dollars  
of real personal income per capita.  Here you see  
a different pattern that has a lot more continuity.   
In fact, we never, during this entire period, spent  
as much per pupil per available resource as the rest 
of the country.  What’s going on here?  This curve 
is nearly ﬂat, so even if we’ve always been a little 
chintzy compared to the rest of the country, why 
did spending per pupil in the previous graph  
suddenly take a tumble?  
One possibility might be that we just don’t tax 
ourselves very hard in general.  That’s not true, it 
turns out.  It hasn’t been, and still isn’t, through-
out this 30-year period.  If you sum up all the 
expenditures made by state and local governments 
(below), you’ll see that before Proposition 13 we 
were spending a little more than the rest of the 
country, and after Proposition 13 we spent less.  
Proposition 13 hammered us for a year or two,  
but we had a ﬁve-billion-dollar surplus at the  
time that cushioned the blow, which was one  
reason why people voted yes on 13 in the ﬁrst 
place.  They felt that Jerry Brown was sitting  
on their money.  We’ve been catching up with  
the other states since then, and now we’re about 
even.  So our decline in per-pupil spending is not 
the result of not taxing ourselves enough, or of  
not spending enough public money in general.  
Another possibility came to me one day when 
there was a big public event at Beckman Audito-
rium—I think it was a puppet show—and  
hundreds of school buses converged on the 
campus.  Caltech was just taken over by six- to 
nine-year-olds, and I thought, “My God, there’s a 
lot of kids in California!”  And so I thought, well, 
maybe we can’t spend as much per pupil because 
we have so many more of them.  Maybe the state 
has a very young age structure, and there are just  
a lot more public-school children in California as  
a percentage of the population.  But if you can see 
the difference between the two lines in the plot 
above, your eyes are pretty good, because there 
isn’t much.  With certain exceptions, like Florida, 
it turns out that there aren’t major differences in 
the age structures of America’s states.  
All right then, I wondered, does California  
send more of its students to private schools?   
No.  It turns out we don’t.  
So we’re not spending less per pupil because 
we’re spending less on everything.  We’re not 
spending less per pupil because we have more 
pupils per capita.  What the ﬁgure at the top  
left of the next page shows is that we’re spending 
less per pupil, basically, because we devote less of 
our budget to it.  The ﬁgure charts the combined 
expenditures of state and local governments, 
because—California’s not unique, but we may be 
the extreme case—the admixture of state and local 
funds from program to program is so complicated 
Above:  But if you look at 
the data in terms of 
spending per pupil per thou-
sand dollars of per 
capita personal income (a 
much better measure of how 
much money is 
actually available to be 
taxed), the numbers tell a dif-
ferent story.  Spending began 
a slight downturn 
even before Proposition 13 
passed, but has really 
remained fairly constant.
Right:  Proposition 13’s 
chief effect can be seen by 
plotting total expenditures by 
all levels of state and 
local government per 
thousand dollars of personal 
income.  Spending 
in California dropped 
sharply, but has gradually 
 rebounded as these 
governments have turned 
 to other sources of 
revenue.
Right:  The percentage of 
California’s total popula-
tion enrolled in public 
schools does not differ 
signiﬁcantly from the 
national average.
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that ﬁguring out where one stops and another 
starts is frankly not worth it.  In any case, I think 
you get a more accurate picture by looking at the 
combination of state and local spending.  And, 
again, you see that we always have devoted, and 
continue to devote, less of the overall budget to 
public education than other states.  In fact, if we 
pulled our spending percentage up to the national 
average, our expenditures per pupil would be a 
little higher than the national average.  
Well, if we’ve got just as large a budget (ad-
justed for population, etc.) as the other states,  
and we’re spending less on K–12 education, that 
means we’ve got to be spending more somewhere 
else.  And, in fact, the one place where we now  
and for this entire period have spent substantially  
more per capita than the other states is law  
enforcement.  (This is a slight misnomer; what 
I’ve tracked below is actually cops and prisons.  
Police and prison expenditures are about 75 per-
cent of the total criminal-justice budget.  Judicial 
administration and court expenses add another 25 
percent or so to these numbers.)  Right now we 
spend nearly 3 percent more of our budget—about 
81/
2
 percent, compared to a bit less than 6 percent 
for other states—on cops and prisons.  If we were 
to shift that money—about $900 per pupil, or, at 
5.7 million pupils, roughly $5 billion per year—
to education, we’d basically be up to the national 
average.  Of course, that would mean having a lot 
fewer police cars on the street and a lot more bad 
guys walking around, but that’s the sort of trade-
off that policy makers must engage in.  And in 
California we tend to err on the side of cops  
and prisons.  
In 1968, the California prison population  
was about 16,000; now it’s about 165,000.  That 
doesn’t include the very large batch of people in 
county slammers—to be counted as a prisoner, you 
have to be sentenced to a year or more.  I think 
we’re getting really good at building prisons, by 
the way.  We can put a 4,500-unit, state-of-the-art 
facility on line for about 330 million bucks.  We 
do the same thing with prisons that the French 
did with nuclear power plants—we just apply  
the same plan over and over, like a cookie cutter.  
There are certain economies there.  
Is this bad public policy?  The statistic I always 
read is that spending on prisons is crazy because it 
costs $30,000 a year to send a kid to Harvard, and 
about $75,000 to put him in Avenal.  Well, a lot 
of people have done economic analyses of this, and 
prison actually looks like a pretty good investment 
if you’re worried about the return to society.  
These studies say that inmates, were they not in 
prison, would each be doing some $100,000 per 
year’s worth of economic damage to society on 
average.  That’s apart from what disutility you 
might get out of being hit over the head while 
you’re being mugged.  So on an economic basis, 
we could lock a lot more people up before the mar-
ginal cost of locking up the next inmate  
equals the marginal gain to society monetarily.  
But there are other reasons why people are put 
in jail and kept there, over and above straightfor- 
Right:  California has 
always (at least for the 
last 30-odd years) spent a 
smaller percentage of its 
state and local budgets on 
K–12 education than other 
states. 
Left:  On the other hand, 
we’ve always spent more 
on cops and prisons, such 
as the now-decommis-
sioned Alcatraz.
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ward economic  
calculations.  When 
my wife worked as  
a prison librarian in 
Connecticut in the 
1970s, she had two 
inmate helpers named 
Stosh and Phil.  Well, 
shortly after World 
War II, Stosh had cut 
his wife up into little 
pieces, and Phil had 
murdered a highway 
patrolman.  And all 
those years later they 
were still in jail.  So 
there are punitive,  
as well as economic, 
reasons for long prison 
sentences.  
Crime data (top) suggests that California’s 
expenditures are paying off.  In 1997, for the ﬁrst 
year in history since the FBI began keeping these 
statistics, the crime rate in California was lower 
than the national average.  (In 1980, by way of 
contrast, it was about 30 percent higher than the 
national average.)  Crime in California has gone 
down by about 35 percent over the last ﬁve years, 
as we’ve locked up very large numbers of people, 
compared to a decline of about 15 percent for the 
rest of the country.  So we are locking up a lot of  
guys (left); crime is going down.  Whether A 
causes B, who knows?  
Moving on, I also charted spending on public 
assistance (below).  We historically have spent a  
lot more on welfare than the other states, but in  
the early ’90s they caught up with us.  They 
responded to the recession by increasing welfare 
expenditures, as one might expect.  We didn’t do 
that, as you may recall—we cut back on welfare 
spending instead.  
That is, California 
decreased individual 
payments.  But the 
caseload grew, so the 
overall welfare budget 
held steady.  In other 
words, the total pie 
stayed the same, but 
there were more  
people, so that each 
person got a smaller 
slice.  In the last 
couple of years (not 
shown on that graph), 
expenditures nation-
wide have declined as  
welfare reform has 
kicked in and welfare 
rolls have shrunk  
dramatically.  
And ﬁnally, I looked at spending on county 
hospitals and public-health programs.  As you can 
see at the top of the next page, we kept pace with 
the national average pretty closely until the ’90s, 
Left:  The crime rate in California, as measured by the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Report Index, has in the past far outpaced 
 the national average.  We’ve recently caught up, however— 
or caught down, as the case may be. 
Below:  Is this dramatic drop a consequence of our prison-
building binge?  We jail a larger percentage of our 
population than all but a few other states. 
Left:  “Welfare” encom-
passes a spectrum of social 
services, including Aid for 
Families with Dependent 
Children (now called 
Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families), General 
Assistance, Supplemental 
Security Income, programs 
 to help the blind and 
disabled, children’s 
services, and foster homes. 
The hump in the California 
data from the early 1970s 
may be an artifact.
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when we started spending about 2 percent more 
on health and hospitals.  I don’t know exactly  
what happened, but I think it’s a substitution  
effect.  People on welfare automatically get Medi- 
Cal, which is a form of health insurance.  But 
when they leave welfare, they generally get low-
paying jobs that don’t include health beneﬁts.  
Then, when they show up at the hospital unin-
sured, the county eats the cost of their care instead 
of charging it to the Medi-Cal budget.  If you add 
the numbers together, you’ll actually see quite a 
continuity in overall welfare, health, and hospital 
spending.  It’s just that we’ve shifted money away 
from the welfare account, which includes Medi-
Cal, and toward the county hospital and public-
health budgets.  
So all our per-taxpayer spending patterns have 
been very consistent, year in and year out, which 
brings us back to the initial question:  Why has 
spending per student taken a nosedive since the 
passage of Proposition 13?  The answer is actually 
fairly straightforward.  If you look at the relative  
size of the tax base in California, that is, our real 
per-capita income compared to the rest of the 
country, we used to be quite rich, as shown above 
right.  In 1968, per-capita income in California 
was 21 percent higher than that in the rest of the 
country.  Today, it’s about 4 percent higher.  It 
would be easy to blame bad policy choices by the  
people who run California, but I don’t think that’s  
the problem.  It’s really part of a very long-term  
convergence in state incomes nationwide.  In 
1965, for example, the states of the former Con-
federacy had, believe it or not, per-capita incomes 
of about 75 percent of the national level.  Now 
they’re up to about 90 percent.  And you see  
similar dramatic convergences across all the states.  
Per-capita incomes in the rich states are growing, 
too, but incomes in the poor states have grown 
faster.  And obviously if we grow, say, half a per-
cent less quickly per year over a long period of 
time, we’ll lose ground, in relative terms, as the 
poor states catch up.  So the rich states are still 
rich, in absolute terms, but they just aren’t as rich 
as they used to be in comparison to the poor states. 
What this means for us is that the afﬂuent Cali-
fornia of 1968 could devote a relatively small share 
of its resources to public schools and still outspend 
the rest of the country on a per-pupil basis.  The 
more-average California of 1997 has not changed 
its spending habits and so falls short.  Our history 
of chintzing out has caught up with us, and we 
can no longer get more while spending less.  
Is anything in these data connected with Proposi-
tion 13?  There’s that hiccup around 1980, but 
that’s about it.  I think any effect attributable to 
the loss of revenue associated with Proposition 13 
was small and transitory.  
Well, what about the third whammy I men-
tioned at the beginning—the Serrano decisions?  
Have they had an effect?  To refresh your memory, 
the Serrano decisions basically mandated equal per-
student expenditures, to within $100 or so (it’s 
now to within about $300, because of inﬂation), in 
all California school districts.  As usual, California  
led the way with this, but by now there have been  
24 other states that have had Serrano-like deci-
sions.  These things have to wend their way 
through the courts, so about 11 states—it depends 
on how you count—have actually implemented 
Serrano-like equalization schemes and by now have  
had some experience with them.  I had Jamie 
Bishop, a SURF (Summer Undergraduate Research 
Fellowship) student from Purdue, look at them 
last summer, and most of those states, if anything, 
had actually shifted more money into education.  
In 1998, for example, the people in New Hamp-
shire had their local-property-tax basis of funding 
public education declared unconstitutional, and 
they came that close to going with a state income 
tax.  They somehow managed to avoid it, but they  
raised another $100 million—which is a lot for a  
little state like that!—to come up with the  
additional monies they needed.  (They have less 
Right:  California’s 
spending on health care 
and hospitals tracked the 
rest of the nation’s fairly 
closely until the beginning 
of the ’90s.
Far right:  While California 
still epitomizes the good 
life for many, we aren’t as 
ﬁlthy rich as we used to 
be—the rest of the 
country is fast catching up.
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than four percent of our school population, so this 
is roughly comparable to us raising over $2.5 bil-
lion.)  Furthermore, over the last 30 years virtually 
every state in the country has seen a substantial 
shift in public support from local to state-level 
sources.  These days, about two-thirds of public  
elementary- and secondary-education money 
comes from the state.  So local property taxes  
are becoming less tightly linked to educational 
spending.  
To sum up, I think Mr. Schrag and the conven-
tional wisdom are wrong.  In the greater scheme  
of things, the effects of Proposition 13 and its 
companions on educational spending today are 
negligible.  Instead, I see amazing patterns of  
continuity, both in the extent to which we’re  
willing to tax ourselves, and the budget shares  
that various functions of state and local govern-
ment receive.  Budgetary data from many different 
areas have this quality.  There’s a lot of weeping 
and gnashing of teeth every year as the budget 
battles occur, but when the smoke settles, every-
body gets about what they got the year before  
plus a little more.  A friend of mine, the late  
Aaron Wildavsky, invented a theory about it he 
called incrementalism.  It happens every time—
look at what Governor Gray Davis proposed to  
do with the additional four billion dollars that  
the accountants say have miraculously accumu- 
lated in California’s treasury as a result of the 
strong economy.  Guess what?  Education’s going 
to get about $1.3 billion of it, which is right in 
line with the proportion it’s always received.  So 
even today, at the margin, when you give the state 
government an additional four billion dollars and 
watch ’em spend it, it gets divided up in very 
much the same manner that the budget always  
has been.  I’m not saying that California’s public 
schools don’t have problems, but I can’t trace their 
plight to Proposition 13, or really see Proposition 
13 as all that signiﬁcant an event in the long term 
of California history.  
As the economy improves, we will catch up 
somewhat with the rest of the nation, but we will 
never see signiﬁcant gains until we start spending 
a larger share of the budget on education.  We may 
be moving that way—education went up a little 
this last year—but there’s no guarantee that that 
will continue to happen. ■
Professor of Political Science D. Roderick Kiewiet got 
his BA at the University of Iowa in 1974.  He came to  
Caltech as an assistant professor in 1979 while still 
working on his PhD, which he got from Yale in 1980.  
He has written numerous papers on Californian and 
Russian politics, both of which many observers ﬁnd  
to be inscrutably Byzantine.  He has written one book, 
Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral 
Effects of Economic Issues, and coauthored another, 
The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties 
and the Appropriations Process, (with Mathew  
McCubbins of UC San Diego) for which they shared  
the American Political Science Association’s Kammerer  
Award for the best book on U.S. national policy.   
Despite his assertion that he is a latecomer to the study of 
education, he has long been interested in student welfare.  
He’s served as dean of students (1992–96) and on half 
a dozen student-related committees, including his current 
stint on the Core Curriculum Steering Committee.  This 
research is supported by the Haynes Foundation and the 
Public Policy Institute of California.  
His son goes to a private school.  
I’m a political scientist, so the theory of education is not my ﬁeld.  But 
in all the studies I’ve read on student performance (again, as measured by 
one of those four or ﬁve standardized tests), the variable that’s been found 
to correlate most strongly is the educational level of the student’s mother.  
Once you control for that, the rest of the variables don’t explain an awful 
lot of the remaining variance.  And the good news is, overall education 
levels are higher, particularly in minority populations.  Black and Latino 
children have much higher graduation rates and college-attendance rates 
than their parents.  They are still signiﬁcantly below white and Asian  
children, but the gap is closing.  We continue to live in a world where  
each generation of children is somewhat better educated than their parents. 
Alan Krueger of Princeton has been analyzing the data generated by the 
state of Tennessee’s massive four-year study, called the STAR (for Student/
Teacher Achievement Ratio) experiment.  His ﬁndings suggest that  
reducing class size appears to have a small, but persistent and cumulative, 
effect.  In other words, the students who are in small classes as ﬁrst- and 
second-graders do a little better at that time, and continue to do a little 
better throughout the rest of their school years.  So former governor Pete 
Wilson’s idea of mandating smaller class sizes is probably a good one.  
I know of another study, by Julian Betts at the University of San Diego, 
which found that homework seems to help.  Lots of schools don’t require 
much homework, and it turns out that the students at the ones that do 
tend to score consistently better.  Of course, to make that happen, parents 
have to make sure that the homework gets done.  The schools can roar at 
the ocean like King Lear, and nothing is going to happen if the parents are  
not involved.  I think the partnership between schools and parents is criti-
cal, and a lot of times that’s been missing in California.  So it’s not just 
expenditures that’s to blame.  I’m sure many of you have had the experience 
of looking at your kid’s homework and saying, “You’re in ﬁfth grade, and 
you’re doing long division with remainders?  Sheesh, you should be farther 
along than that.”  So you spend a lot of time with your child supplement-
ing the school curriculum, especially in science and math.  Unfortunately, 
that really exacerbates inequalities in opportunities—if your parents are 
Caltech graduates, you can go to an awfully crummy school and you’re 
probably still going to be ﬁne, at least educationally.  Maybe not emotion-
ally or psychologically.  But my point is that the parents supplement what’s 
going on in the classroom.  
